Religion and trust: an experimental study

We investigate the relationship between religion and trust. Using a questionnaire, we measure: i) general religiosity, and; ii) the extent of religious beliefs, experience, and ritual. These are then analyzed with behaviour in a trust game (Berg et al., Games and Economic Behaviour, 1995), which we also extend by proving information of a potential trustee's religiosity in certain tasks. We find that trusting increases with the potential trustee's religiosity. The extent to which trusting increases with a trustee's religiosity, in turn, increases with a truster's religiosity. Trustworthiness also increases with religiosity, and at an increasing rate. --Religiosity,Trust,Stereotype,Questionnaire,Experiment

On the beliefs off the path: equilibrium refinement due to quantal response and level-k

This paper studies the relevance of equilibrium and nonequilibrium explanations of behavior, with respects to equilibrium refinement, as players gain experience. We investigate this experimentally using an incomplete information sequential move game with heterogeneous preferences and multiple perfect equilibria. Only the limit point of quantal response (the limiting logit equilibrium), and alternatively that of level-k reasoning (extensive form rationalizability), restricts beliefs off the equilibrium path. Both concepts converge to the same unique equilibrium, but the predictions differ prior to convergence. We show that with experience of repeated play in relatively constant environments, subjects approach equilibrium via the quantal response learning path. With experience spanning also across relatively novel environments, though, level-k reasoning tends to dominate

Indenture as a Self-Enforced Contract Device: An Experimental Test

We experimentally test the efficacy of indenture as a self-enforced contract device. In an indenture game, the principal signals the intention of payment-on-delivery, by tearing a banknote and giving the agent half of it as "prepayment"; the agent receives the completing half after delivering the service. By forward induction, cooperation is incentive-compatibly self-enforcing. The indenture performs very well, inducing a significantly higher level of cooperation than that in a three-stage centipede game, which we use to benchmark the natural rate of cooperation. The difference between cooperation rates in both games increases over time.Cooperation, experiment, contracts, indenture, reciprocity

Calculation of stress intensity factors in an isotropic multicracked plate. Part 1: Theoretical development

An essential part of describing the damage state and predicting the damage growth in a multicracked plate is the accurate calculation of stress intensity factors (SIF's). Here, a methodology and rigorous solution formulation for SIF's of a multicracked plate, with fully interacting cracks, subjected to a far-field arbitrary stress state is presented. The fundamental perturbation problem is derived, and the steps needed to formulate the system of singular integral equations whose solution gives rise to the evaluation of the SIF's are identified. This analytical derivation and numerical solution are obtained by using intelligent application of symbolic computations and automatic FORTRAN generation capabilities (described in the second part of this paper). As a result, a symbolic/FORTRAN package, named SYMFRAC, that is capable of providing accurate SIF's at each crack tip was developed and validated

The Economics of Solidarity: A Conceptual Framework

For many people "solidarity" has become a meaningless word used in slogans - too often used without leading to any economic consequences. We show in this paper conditions under which solidarity can be a powerful instrument. In a solidary action, an individual in a group contributes to a series of actions that aims for a reallocation of scarce resources. The willingness to contribute is mainly influenced by the efficiency of the objective of the solidary action, and is enhanced by feelings of mutual exchange (solidarity) within a group. --solidarity,altruism,dynamic,mutual

Which is the More Predictable Gender? Public Good Contribution and Personality

Personality questionnaires have been used and can be used to predict behavior in economic settings. Using two sets of state-of-the-art measures from personality psychology (the Big Six) and social psychology (Social Value Orientation), we find that the behavior of men is predictable in the first half of a public good contribution experiment, whereas that of women is not. This result agrees with the reinterpretation of Carol Gilligan's (1982) view that women are more sensitive to the context in which decisions are made. --gender,context,personality,public goods